Combat Maneuver Training Center

News from the "Box"



APR -JUN 03 **Issue 6**

DISCLAIMER

This CMTC publication is not a doctrinal product and is not intended to serve as a program to guide the conduct of operations and training. The information and lessons herein are the perceptions of those individuals involved in military exercises, activities, and real-world events. Our intent is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner.

"News From The Box" is prepared by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), CMTC Detachment. For additional information contact CPT Mike Sennett or Mr. Dan Reinick, DSN 466-2323, or email: michael.sennett@cmtc.7atc.army.mil; danny.reinick@cmtc.7atc.army.mil.

REPRODUCE AND DISTRIBUTE THIS BULLETIN TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS

To download additional copies of this edition, go to the CALL-CMTC website:
http://www.cmtc.7atc.army.mil/Units/CALL/Index.htm

FOREWORD

The Combat Maneuver Training Center's "News from the Box" is designed as a direct communications channel between CMTC and our USAREUR based commanders and warfighters.

My intent is for this document to provide a candid and open forum that provides our USAREUR training audience ground-truth observations from our CMTC Observer Controllers. Service as an OC is arguably one of the most professionally rewarding jobs any of us will ever have. OCs are provided the opportunity to build upon their operational experience by observing our Army's best and brightest during numerous rotations, executing repetitive missions, throughout the training year. Their firsthand experience, privileged observation of training units, and understanding of doctrine combine to make our OCs one of the best sources of information on TTPs that work and insights into potential solutions to reverse negative training trends. The following articles were written with that goal in mind.

Improving Actions on Contact. Rotational units training at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) routinely experience difficulty finding, fixing, and destroying the enemy while taking actions on contact. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) presented in this article are not new or necessarily innovative. However, they are intended to provide a focused discussion of TTPs proven to facilitate successful actions on contact for the maneuver platoon — with success being defined as the destruction of the enemy while maintaining viable combat power.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance in the Brigade Support Area (BSA) Defense. Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) in today's contemporary operational environment (COE) requires a thorough assessment of the threats posed against the brigade support area (BSA). All too often, poor intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and poor integration of analysis from the brigade (BDE) S2 — in conjunction with a lack of understanding of the requirements for R&S — lead to ineffective R&S plans for the BSA.

Vehicle Rollovers. Maneuvering combat vehicles during tactical training is risky business. Drivers and track commanders (TCs) must be very proficient in what they do to successfully negotiate the terrain at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, or at any other training area.

I strongly urge leaders to take a few minutes to read these articles and relate the lessons in them to your soldiers. Use the knowledge and experience of others to concentrate your limited training resources on unit weaknesses you recognize from these articles. Your goal is combat readiness. CMTC's mission is to help you attain that goal.

Train to win!

H. Mike Davis
COL, AR
Commanding

IMPROVING ACTIONS ON CONTACT
USING THE REHEARSAL PROCESS EFFECTIVELY

By CPT Matthew J. Cody
Warhog 12, Co/Tm Observer Controller, CMTC

Rotational units training at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) routinely experience difficulty finding, fixing, and destroying the enemy while taking actions on contact. This occurs against both known and unsuspected enemy force positions. Despite an emphasis on planning and preparation — including troop leading procedures (TLPs) and boresighting — most units still tend to lose momentum and culminate on first contact with the opposing forces (OPFOR) during execution.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

There are numerous factors that contribute to this shortfall. However, the two most notable are limited home station training and ineffective rehearsals by crews, sections, and platoons. There are training methods that can increase lethality at the individual, crew, and collective level, including simulations like the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT), gunnery training (target acquisition and engagement), standing operating procedures (SOPs) covering contact/battle drills, and mounted field/situational training exercises (FTX/STX, etc.). However, it is the rehearsal process coupled with the proven notion that practice makes (nearly) perfect which provides the greatest 'bang for the buck' during both home station training and preparation for combat.

The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) presented in this article are not new or necessarily innovative. However, they are intended to provide a focused discussion of TTPs proven to facilitate successful actions on contact for the maneuver platoon — with success being defined as the destruction of the enemy while maintaining viable combat power. The discussion focuses specifically on mounted (full force) rehearsals of contact and battle drills, while maneuvering on terrain similar to that on which you intend to fight. It is not the end-all for TTPs, but a basic methodology, which combined with other key tasks during the preparation phase, will increase crew and platoon level lethality.

COMBAT TRAINING CENTER (CTC) TRENDS

As so often stated throughout the history of warfare, individuals, crews, and platoons determine the success or failure in a fight, and potentially the outcome of the battle itself. The best plans usually deteriorate on first contact, leaving graphics, initiative, and the commander's intent remaining to guide the element throughout the fight. That is precisely why the main focus of this article is at platoon level and below.

CALL Special Study, March 98, entitled ***Closing With the Enemy: Company Team Maneuver***, by LTC James B. Hickey, provides an excellent collection of TTPs and doctrine for the process of closing with and destroying the enemy. It also emphasizes the importance of rehearsing actions on contact. The following task list shows recurring negative trends that units experience at the CTCs. Although the focus is on company/team/troop level, the same applies at platoon level and below.

Observations and Trends: (From **CALL Special Study,** March 98, Hickey**,** pp.3-4)

"...our tank and mechanized infantry company teams:

- do not effectively reconnoiter.
- do not effectively use cover and concealment.
- do not effectively control set-move drills.
- do not gain visual contact before the enemy initiates physical contact.
- do not effectively suppress the enemy.
- do not effectively overwatch bounding elements or provide bases of fire.
- do not execute the best movement technique, formation, or rate of movement for a given enemy situation.
- do not effectively mass lethal direct fires to kill the enemy quickly.
- do not secure flanks and rear.
- do not continue offensive movement to exploit the effects of fires.
- **do not survive."**

One could argue that some of the tasks are more important to train and rehearse than the others. However, the execution of carefully planned and resourced rehearsals inherently addresses each of these trends in an attempt to prevent the combined effects of the trends, which is a loss of substantial combat power and momentum.

An OPFOR tank commander at the National Training Center (NTC) discussed the effect of these trends with regard to actions on contact when he stated:

> "…another observation is the lack of maneuver at the platoon and company level. Often times these elements remain in a picture perfect wedge, which allows the OPFOR vehicle ample opportunity to engage…These elements move too slowly, too predictably, with little or not direct fire support…. Platoons often avoid broken ground to maintain visual contact with all elements in the platoon…tank commanders (must) use the terrain to their utmost advantage" (**Armor Magazine**, dated Nov-Dec 2002, pp. 41-42, ***Letters***, SSG John D. Voccio).

This perspective is not exclusive to the OPFOR at NTC. It can be applied to every CTC, including CMTC. Critical emphasis must be placed on trend reversal, resulting in the OPFOR's defeat and more importantly, the destruction of our enemies in combat.

REHEARSAL TTPs

Call Newsletter No. 98-5, *Rehearsals,* dated March 1998, provides an in-depth analysis of the rehearsal process and associated TTPs. It also provides a script that is useful to incorporate as an SOP for the rehearsal. The focus is more at battalion and task force level than at company and below but the principles and TTPs are useful for every maneuver echelon. The newsletter details five types of rehearsals and six techniques for executing the rehearsal. The five types include: confirmation briefs, backbriefs, combined arms rehearsals, support rehearsals, and battle drill/SOP rehearsals. The six techniques include full dress, reduced force, terrain model, sketch map, map, and frequency modulated (FM) radio rehearsals. This article primarily highlights the battle drill/SOP rehearsal using the full force/mounted technique (although different types and techniques are also referenced). Figure 1 (from ***Rehearsals***, page I-5) shows the rehearsal continuum and the relationship to resources available.



Figure 1

The crawl, walk, and run methodology works best, culminating in the full force rehearsal. Time and resources available are the only limitations to a leader's creative approaches to conducting this rehearsal technique. The rehearsal process also depends on the collective proficiency of the platoon. Regardless, the leadership should start with a chalk/talk-through of each battle drill followed by a walk-through with each soldier participating. Experienced platoons that have trained to a high level of proficiency may require only limited reduced force or terrain model rehearsals prior to the mounted rehearsal. The final event, based on time available, is the mounted full force rehearsal with an emphasis on repetition (preferably on terrain similar to what you will fight on) and the adaptation to changing conditions.

FM 3-20.15, (**FM 17-15**), ***Tank Platoon***, identifies four steps to facilitate the organized decision-making process for the platoon leader:

- Deploy and report.
- Evaluate and develop the situation.
- Choose a course of action (COA).
- Execute the selected COA.

The emphasis during the mounted portion should be on the decision-making process during contact, and the different battle drills associated with the selected COAs. The rehearsal process focuses on each of these steps, with an emphasis on the fourth step. Executing the selected COA based on the seven forms of contact — visual, physical, indirect, obstacles, aircraft, nuclear/biological/chemical

(NBC), and electronic warfare (EW) — includes the selection of a battle drill or drills from the following list:

- Change of formation.
- Contact drill.
- Action drill.
- React to indirect fires drill.
- React to air attack drill.
- React to nuclear attack drill.
- React to biological/chemical drill.

Although formations are an important part of the maneuver rehearsal process, major emphasis should be placed on dispersion, initiative, situational awareness, making contact with the smallest element possible, and maneuvering to mass direct and indirect fires in order to destroy the enemy once contact is made.

Making contact from the flanks and rear while in march/column formation in built-up areas was typical for units taking part in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Rehearsing contact and action drills from the column or staggered column formations are critical in built-up, or urbanized terrain. Platoons must be challenged repetitively in executing these drills or routine (SOP) battle drills.

In the event that time and resources preclude rehearsing certain drills, the platoon must prioritize the drills based on the upcoming mission. Platoons must also incorporate the seven forms of contact into each rehearsal, allowing more time dedicated to killing the enemy instead of fighting the associated conditions.

TTPs FOR THE REHEARSAL PROCESS

Transition From Movement to Maneuver. The properly executed mounted rehearsal comes with repetition and should address a limited number of critical tasks. Focus on at least four tasks or areas during the rehearsal and the associated TTPs. The first task is the transition from movement to maneuver, which is what we hear about in nearly every after action review (AAR) — "we didn't transition from movement to maneuver at the probable line of contact (PLC), and we remained in a wedge formation until we were slant zero".

The commander's job is to conduct a thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to inform his platoons where the transition is going to occur. Among the platoon leader's tasks is the refinement of the commander's IPB and METT-TC [mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support, time available, and civilian considerations] factors during the conduct of troop leading procedures.

Concentrating on these TTPs focuses the plan and facilitates planning, preparation, and execution of rehearsals for the transition to maneuver and contact. It is important to remember that the transition may occur sporadically throughout the depth of the battlespace due to the characteristics of a three-dimensional battlefield. Also, there is more to the transition than deploying units to bounding overwatch by section. A key aspect is using terrain to your advantage, understanding where the enemy is located and how he fights, and presenting the smallest target possible to the enemy. Maneuver at times does affect a platoon's ability to mass fires — however, the concept (scheme of

maneuver) is designed to get the weapons systems into a position to destroy the enemy without compromising survivability.

Using the Terrain to Maximize Maneuver. This is the second task. It sounds simple, but failing to do this results in the rapid degradation of combat power. Platoons typically have difficulty using the terrain because of over-dependence on maintaining visual contact with wingmen or adjacent elements on either flank. Certain terrain, like flat desert, allows maneuver elements to maintain some visual contact with other vehicles within the platoon. However, even desert terrain has undulations, inter-visibility lines, wadis, and adverse weather conditions that provide cover and concealment for maneuvering forces.

The rehearsal process must include drills that maximize dispersion and minimize exposure to the applicable forms of contact. The platoon should practice by conducting set-move drills (technique: bounding) to disperse the platoon, preventing massing of vehicles once contact is made.

Reconnaissance-pull (detailed in **FM 3-20.971**, ***Reconnaissance Troop***, 2 December 2002), Chapter 3-7) is a TTP that the OPFOR uses to facilitate maneuver. Typically, the OPFOR sends only one vehicle forward at a time (an inter-visibility line or two) instead of a section or the entire platoon. While using this technique, the remainder of the platoon provides overwatch for the single forward vehicle. The intent is to avoid a mad dash across the open area by executing deliberate maneuver using both terrain and direct/indirect fires to the platoon's advantage.

This technique works extremely well when reconnaissance elements are observing maneuver forces and the enemy simultaneously. The OPFOR relies heavily upon the recon effort before committing elements to the close fight. Rotational units also task organize with numerous available assets, to include scouts, brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT) elements, ground surveillance radar (GSR) elements, etc., that can facilitate maneuver and enhance survivability. A common scenario has the platoon maneuvering under overwatching fires from either the company or the internal platoon elements. The key is that the overwatch element must be able to observe beyond the maneuver element (two-thirds of the maximum effective range, as a rule) and provide responsive direct *and* indirect fires on contact. This process becomes even more critical in the *red zone* — the enemy's battle space (defined as the disruption zone and the battle zone in the contemporary operating environment) — where he can influence the fight.

Anticipating Contact. The third task is a critical component of the rehearsal. The use of a separate element to portray a thinking enemy — either a headquarters element or another platoon — increases realism. The platoon leader and his subordinates must work through the four steps of actions on contact, using various scenarios. The most common scenario at CMTC that provides the greatest challenge to the rotational unit is contact with an unsuspected enemy force. This action, combined with the other forms of contact, often leads to imminent disaster. Deficiencies in reconnaissance combined with inadequate IPB are frequent contributors to this type of contact. Furthermore, units focus on known enemy forces (based on the situational and doctrinal templates) without considering the agile (thinking) enemy on the battlefield.

It is important to remember that action drills can be done while in contact, dispersed, in limited visibility, and without visual contact of friendly elements. Units *must* rehearse these scenarios in order to increase confidence and prevent fratricide. Units that train battle drills and actions on contact

repetitively will inherently enjoy a higher rate of success against both unsuspected and known enemy forces.

Assaulting the Objective. Units often attempt to rehearse actions on contact with known enemy forces, neglecting to rehearse in detail the assault or breach portion of the attack and the subsequent maneuver on the objective area. Again, whenever possible, this action must be practiced on a piece of terrain that mirrors the objective area. Throughout the process, consider the seven forms of contact, rehearse FM reports (including contact, spot, situation, and logistical reporting), and incorporate fighting under chemical and biological conditions into at least one of the repetitions. Conducting solid rehearsals of the platoon battle drill SOP provides the ability to react to any situation — inherent flexibility — since the plan usually changes on first contact.

The rehearsal process doesn't just end with the last battle drill. In a time-constrained environment, identify the critical tasks that your platoon is weak on and rehearse them repetitively until it is done right. Capture drills and specific TTPs in your platoon SOP. A good platoon SOP must be simple, have relatively few pages, and must focus on the basics including precombat checks and inspections, boresighting, and battle drills/rehearsal procedures. Practice and repetition through the rehearsal process are critical to mission success.

CHECKLIST FOR THE MOUNTED REHEARSAL

Build a simple SOP that includes the following:

REHEARSAL PLANNING

Four Steps:

- Deploy and report.
- Evaluate and develop the situation.
- Choose a COA.
- Execute the selected COA.

Battle Drills:

- Changing formations.
- Contact drills.
- Action drills.
- React to indirect fire drills.
- React to air attack drills.
- React to NBC drills.

TTPs for maneuver: (*recon-pull*, dismounting loaders, calls for fire, non-standard formations)

- Movement formations and techniques

REHEARSAL PREPARATION

- Coordinate with the CO/XO for mounted force on force and terrain location.
- Prioritize the rehearsal based on the commander's guidance, and time and resources available.
- Confirm the task organization and link-up with attachments.

REHEARSAL EXECUTION

Transition from movement to maneuver:

- Focus on dispersion and DO NOT focus on a perfect formation.
- Get all your weapon systems in the fight.

Maneuver on the terrain — use the terrain to YOUR advantage:

- Speed is not always an advantage (think TEMPO) — sometimes restricted terrain will support mechanized maneuver (remember IPB at all levels)
- Train to maneuver without maintaining constant visual contact with your wingmen.
- *Recon pull*: either use assets available to your company, or use assets internal to your platoon (such as cross-talk, dismounts forward, loader on the ground).
- Minimize exposure to the enemy and make contact with the smallest element possible. (Include built-up areas based on mission if possible)
- Anticipate contact with the enemy (initiative versus reactive)
- Work action drills with both known and unknown enemy forces. Since intelligence isn't a perfect science, you will often face chance contacts.
- Assault the objective.
- Focus on movement throughout the breach; practice the direct fire plan (focus, distribute, and shift fires); call for fire.
- Survivability: based on the tempo of the fight and task organization, you will have to reposition both in and out of contact.

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE BRIGADE SUPPORT AREA (BSA) DEFENSE

By MAJ James D. Gregory,
Adler 02, FSB Deputy Observer Controller, CMTC

Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) in today's contemporary operational environment (COE) requires a thorough assessment of the threats posed against the brigade support area (BSA). All too often, poor intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and poor integration of analysis from the brigade (BDE) S2 — in conjunction with a lack of understanding of the requirements for R&S — lead to ineffective R&S plans for the BSA.

The COE impacts this planning problem further by vastly expanding the considerations for R&S of the brigade rear area and the BSA. The BDE and the BSA must ensure that a common operating picture exists between them to ensure continuity of the R&S effort in the rear area. The COE, with its opposing force comprised of the standard regular army forces, independent operators of conventional reconnaissance elements, unconventional special purpose forces (SPF), and terrorists — as well as friendly and hostile civilians on the battlefield — offers ever increasing possible threat scenarios that the BDE / BSA must be prepared for. The BDE S3 and S2, working with the forward support battalion (FSB) S2/3 and FSB intelligence analyst noncommissioned officer (NCO), must ensure that the reconnaissance, surveillance, and security requirements for the brigade rear area are met.

The FSB and its tenant units must also ensure that soldiers understand the rules of engagement (ROE) for dealing with civilians operating in and around the BSA area. The S2/3 must prepare a plan that considers threats from conventional combat forces and unconventional SPF, terrorist elements and civilians operating in the rear area. Thus, the S2/3 and the FSB intelligence analyst NCO must develop R&S plans which focus on a full range of scenarios that could affect the BSA, logistics release points (LRP), ambulance exchange points (AXP), and maintenance collection points (MCP). They must then allocate and request the resources to execute the plan. The R&S plan must incorporate both active and passive measures, such as listening/observation posts (LP/ OPs) and patrols capable of monitoring named areas of interest (NAIs), and zones around the BSA to provide the BSA commander and the BDE S3 the ability to anticipate and decisively respond to all threats to the BSA and BDE rear area. The FSB must aggressively plan and execute an R&S plan in conjunction with the full support of the brigade in order to ensure uninterrupted anticipatory logistics.

Begin by gathering the right resources. Find the following field manuals in your publication library or online: **FM 34-1 (FM 2-0),** ***Intelligence & Electronic Warfare Operations*****; FM 34-2** ***Collection Management*** **(FM 2-33.4,** ***Analysis and Synthesis*****); FM 34-2-1** ***Reconnaissance and Surveillance*** **(FM 2-00.21,** ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance***, ***and Target Acquisition)*****; FM 34-3**, ***Intelligence Analysis (FM 2-33.4)*****; FM 34-130 (FM 2-01.3)** ***Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield***. Next, gather the current intelligence products and situational picture from the BDE S2 and ensure the All Source Analysis System (ASAS) is updated.

Now lets take a look at the development of the R&S plan. The key elements required to develop a good R&S plan consist of IPB and collection management.

The IPB process has four steps, consisting of:

- Defining the battlefield environment.
- Describing the battlefield's effects.
- Evaluating the threat.
- Determining threat courses of action (COAs).

The flow of the IPB process can be seen below in Figure 1.



Figure 1

The first step of defining the battlefield environment includes: identifying significant characteristics of the environment, identifying limits of the command's area of operations, establishing limits on the area of interest, identifying the amount of detail and the time available to go into the IPB process, identifying intelligence gaps, and finally, collecting the material required to complete the IPB process. The end state is having the IPB focused on areas and characteristics of the battlefield, which will influence the FSB mission.

Second, describe the battlefield effects by analyzing the terrain, weather, and characteristics of the battlefield. This aspect of analysis uses the old acronym OCOKA, (observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach). Describe the battlefield's effects on threat and friendly capabilities and broad COAs. The end state of this phase of IPB development is to identify how the battlefield environment influences the operations and the COAs of threat and friendly forces. Sample terrain and weather analyses are displayed in Figures 2 and 3 respectively.



Figure 2



Figure 3

Third, evaluate the threat. Update or create threat models by converting threat doctrine or patterns of operations to graphics and describe the threat actions and options. Identify high value targets (HVTs) and list them in priority of importance to the FSB. A method of recording threat models is to use the target spreadsheet. A complete threat model consists of a graphic depiction, description, and identification of HVTs. The end state is that threat COAs developed in the next step of the IPB reflect what the threat capabilities are in similar situations. Below are examples of a complete threat model and HVT matrix in Figures 4 and 5 respectively.



Figure 4



Figure 5

Finally, determine threat COAs. Begin by identifying the threat's likely objectives and desired end states. Identify a full set of COAs available to the threat. Evaluate and prioritize the COAs developed. We must determine the terrain, weather, and doctrinal impacts on each potential threat COA. An overlay depiction of the analysis process and what it looks like in developing threat COAs is shown in Figure 6. Figure 7 shows a diagram of an actual situation template.



Figure 6



Figure 7

Last, identify initial collection requirements. The event template is depicted as drawn in Figure 8 and is a guide for information collection planning. The process involves identifying NAIs to focus the collection process on what the commander thinks will be the enemy's most likely COA based on formulated situation templates. These NAIs will help quickly confirm or deny what the enemy is doing. Having multiple situation templates to use in wargaming efforts will assist in conducting thorough analysis and ensure that whatever COA the enemy chooses, the commander will have an idea of where to place assets and how the enemy will likely fight. The end state is that the FSB commander and staff will avoid being surprised with an unanticipated threat action and also be able to quickly narrow the threat's COAs to the one he has chosen.



Figure 8

In Figure 9, is a situation template matrix to help analyze where and when a NAI will be needed and most likely be active with enemy activity. This matrix will also assist in placing resources to ensure no gaps in coverage and ensure redundancy is built into the plan.

NAI 1	EW Package	ADA suppression package	Strike package	Fighter intercept package			
NAI 2		EW Package	ADA suppression package	Strike package			
NAI 3			EW Package	ADA suppression package	Strike package		
NAI 4				EW Package	ADA suppression package	Strike package	
NAI 5					Fighter intercept package	Fighter intercept package	
NAI 6					EW Package	ADA suppression package	
NAI 7						EW Package	
NAI / TIME	**H-20**min	**H-16**min	**H-14**min	**H-9**min	**H-7**min	**H-3**min	

Figure 9

The NAI development for an FSB will likely be done in a circular fashion around the BSA, focusing on high-speed avenues of approach or built-up areas around the BSA. We must consider main supply routes (MSRs) in this process and provide a means of collection to ensure that routes stay clear. Below in Figure 10 is a method of identifying areas of concern to the BSA. The NAIs were selected because of the built-up areas or high-speed avenue intersections into and out of the area of operation. With eyes on these areas, the commander can prevent surprises for the BSA and its defense network.



Figure 10

Figure 11 shows the role that IPB plays in the planning process for the FSB commander. It is important to note that this process is continual and that the FSB commander will have to have a situational template matrix tied to decision points to allow him the flexibility to make decisions as the enemy moves on the battlefield. These decision points should never be in reaction to what the enemy does but instead a precursor to what the enemy will do next.



Figure 11

R&S Planning

The IPB process has been explained to this point. Next is developing a solid R&S plan to execute the collection management process. This process consists of four steps:

- Receiving and analyzing requirements.
- Determining resource availability and capability.
- Evaluating reporting.
- Updating collection planning.

Receiving and analyzing requirements means identifying what the commander must know about the enemy, weather, and terrain to accomplish the logistics mission. Normally, the commander's concerns are expressed as questions, termed priority intelligence requirements (PIR). PIR are either stated by the commander or recommended by the intelligence analyst and FSB S2/3 and then approved by the commander. They are the reason R&S plans exist. The S2/3 must also include requirements from higher headquarters in developing the PIRs. Figure 12 shows an example of the process involving PIR, indicator, specific information requirements (SIR), and specific orders and requests (SOR).

Next, the commander determines what resources and individual capabilities are available to look for the specific information he has determined to be PIR.



Figure 12

Now, task resources commensurate with the task at hand. Tell the resource exactly what it is to look for and how it is to report information. If the FSB does not have the resources required to answer the PIR then a request for augmentation must be forwarded to brigade to answer the PIR. In most cases, other brigade resources are already covering the PIR, merely enabling the PIR to become part of the information flow from the BDE S2 to ensure the FSB commander stays informed. Figure 13 depicts a sample R&S plan-tasking matrix.

The FSB INTEL analyst NCO and the FSB S2/3 must evaluate how well the resources are reporting what they see based on their capabilities. They must also ask the question, "Does the information we are receiving answer the PIR question for the commander?"

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO

MISSION: _____DTG:

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q
PRIORITY	NAI	START / STOP	SIR/INSTRUCTIONS	HQ DET	A CO	B CO	C CO	ARTRNS	INTRNS	ARTRNS	FATRNS	ENTRNS	MPs	ADA	COORDINATION	REPORTS
1	1	100400 110600	Is the enemy conducting reconnaissance around LRP 1 (quarry) along MSR Cherry		X					X	X	X	X		A CO Establish OP and Observe vicinity Grid QV113593. All units observe MSRs and vicinity around LRP 1	SOR: "Report on status of friendly obstacles and the area around the obstacles (footprints, or crushed vegetation)." - S2. Report on any enemy / civilian reconnaissance of Tankers and AMMO assets in LRP 1 or along MSRs going to LRP 1 (or evidence of such activity such as crushed vegetation and footprints in covered and concealed areas). – S2.

Figure 13

Finally, is there a need for more information to answer the PIR questions? Or is it time to shift focus and begin answering other questions? To satisfy the commander's SIR it is important to understand how to plan collection missions, understand collection management strategy, understand resource capabilities, task organize to accomplish the entire R&S mission, and finally, ensure there is redundancy in the plan and collection effort.

A note on R&S and security of convoys: Sometimes it is impossible to have an R&S plan that is thorough enough or possesses the resources available to cover the entire network of MSRs and support nodes within a BDE or division area. In these cases, units must do reconnaissance in force with their convoys to preclude the loss of critical assets. This task is done by using gun trucks. Tenant units within the BSA are tasked to provide vehicles with mounted crew served weapons to afford security to convoys while en route. These gun trucks provide the convoy commander an added punch if he encounters resistance or an ambush along his route of march. These vehicles must be situated in the convoy to allow the convoy commander freedom of maneuver in case of an ambush. Also, the convoy commander must always have communications with these trucks.

A final thought to the FSB S2/3 and intelligence analyst NCO for planning purposes: The support operations officer (SPO) develops a concept of support, and with that comes a daily logistics synchronization matrix. This matrix will help in planning for security of the FSB's critical assets. When the SPO tasks companies with missions, a copy of the synchronization matrix must be provided to the S2/3 so the staff can formulate the defense of LRPs, AXPs, MCPs, refuel on the move (ROM) sites, and helicopter landing zones in sector as they are activated and inactivated. The S2/3 must review all requirements for the BSA defense and protection of its assets when they are conducting missions outside the BSA. The S2/3 will be successful if coordination with the SPO takes place daily and all SPO taskings are put on the R&S tasking matrix. This practice will ensure that the commander's critical assets are protected and that NAIs are chosen, taking all aspects of the logistical mission into account.

Keeping these ideals in mind and systems in place within the battle staff's military decision-making process ensures the command's intelligence requirements will be met during routine planning. Having the R&S plan built into the defense plan for the brigade rear area and the BSA ensures anticipatory, flexible, and uninterrupted support to the brigade combat team.

VEHICLE ROLLOVERS

USE SAFETY PROCEDURES TO SAVE LIVES

By CPT Steven W. Nettleton
Visual Information Personnel (VIPERS) Team Chief, CMTC

How much regard does a 68-ton armored vehicle have for the human body? None at all. The danger of driving to work on busy highways is rivaled only by the possible dangers we face when riding our tracks at work — on the battlefield. Designed as fast weapons platforms, combat vehicles are intended to cause mayhem and destruction on the enemy, and are capable of withstanding massive punishment. However, as these vehicles do not distinguish between friend and foe, we must constantly remain vigilant and safety-conscious around them.

SAFETY IS PART OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

Maneuvering combat vehicles during tactical training is a risky business. Drivers and track commanders (TCs) must be very proficient in what they do to successfully negotiate the terrain at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, or at any other training area. Safety is a high priority for all unit commanders and is a component of force protection. All commanders, leaders, and soldiers use risk assessment and management to incorporate force protection with the mission. Safety is a vital aspect of mission accomplishment, preserving combat power and readiness.

There are numerous safety measures to keep in mind when working with armored and other tactical vehicles. Crewmen must be routinely aware and prepared to assess the dangers of the environment they are operating in. Important issues to be accountable for include adequate communications, secure hatch covers and equipment, speed control, emergency stopping procedures, riding positions, vehicle mounting and dismounting procedures, crew evacuation drills, and using general situational awareness to avoid vehicle accidents.

TRACKED VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

When a vehicle crew has an accident, they may be lucky to avoid any serious injuries. This luck is primarily attributed to how well the crew has prepared themselves. The best armored crews are familiar with **TC 21-36**, ***Tracked Combat Vehicle Driver Training***, especially Chapter 3, ***Safety Awareness***.

There are several main factors that contribute to vehicle accidents. Fatigue and sleep loss typically cause errors of omission. Situational awareness allows a crew to take precautions relevant to wet or muddy conditions, positions of guns, gun mounts, hatches, or any other projected objects such as large tree limbs, open ditches and fighting positions, or even other vehicles in the area. Blind spots can hide potential dangers on the ground unless vehicle commanders and other crewmembers help the driver identify objects or conditions that may come into his blind spots. If in doubt, the vehicle commander should use a ground guide to assist the driver. Driving too fast for conditions is a main cause for loss of control in tracked and wheeled vehicles. Once the driver loses control, he must attempt to coast to a stop with minimal braking. If the vehicle is sliding, the driver must steer in the direction of the skid to regain control of the vehicle.

VEHICLE ROLLOVERS

During a night move across the valley floor full of washouts and ravines, the lead tank's track slips right and starts to pitch at a steep angle. Gravity takes over and inverts a 68-ton tank. This is not the time to think about rollover drills.

The safest place for a crew during a rollover is inside the vehicle. High-centered vehicles are more at risk, especially when turning on rugged terrain. If a vehicle is about to roll over, the driver or TC must alert the crew members so they can drop inside the vehicle and assume safe positions by bracing themselves inside the vehicle. The driver must lower his seat and also brace himself inside the vehicle. Crews must practice rollover procedures.

Many have given the excuse that rollover drills take too much time to practice — time that could be spent on maintenance or gunnery drills. Regardless of the time it takes, besides saving lives, these drills are mandated by policy and regulation. They are covered in ***Army Regulation 385-55,* Prevention of Motor Vehicle Accidents**, and also covered thoroughly in operator's manuals for each armored vehicle in the Army inventory.

Rollover drills must begin with each crewmember knowing his proper position in the track. Track commanders (TCs) must avoid the bad habit of riding too high in the hatch. Most TCs know about the chest (nametag) defilade standard in **TC 21-306**. They should not expose any more of their upper body than above the nametag on their uniform. Nametag defilade is a requirement for the exercise rules of engagement at all training centers. It is important to remember the less you have exposed outside the track, the less vulnerable you are to hostile fire, and the less time it will take to get inside the vehicle if it takes an unexpected somersault.

Repetitively practicing rollover drills will teach every crewmember what to do in case the vehicle rolls and should make it second nature. Rollover drills shouldn't just be practiced on safety stand-down days. They should be implemented before all deployments and should become a standard crew drill, as common as loading and firing drills.

PREVENTIVE MEASURES

Obviously, preventing an accident is preferable to reacting to one. Leaders at all levels must enforce standards. Crewmembers must wear the complete combat vehicle crewman's uniform, including the combat vehicle crewman (CVC) helmets and flame retardant CVC uniforms. Loose equipment such as weapons, radios, ammunition boxes, and tools can be deadly projectiles if not secured in accordance with unit load plans.

To preclude rollover incidents, units must develop skills in night vision techniques and ground guiding, identifying terrain hazards, and using seat belts. When negotiating rough terrain, drivers and TCs must use safe speeds, scan to detect obstacles, holes, and ditches, alert crewmembers when approaching rough terrain or overhead obstacles, and warn the crew when the vehicle is going out of control. These preventive measures should be taught and reinforced during driver and crew training to keep safe and ready to fight tomorrow's battles. Safety demands total chain of command involvement. Battle drills such as the vehicle rollover drill are a form of risk management because they enhance command and control, reduce uncertainty, and ensure high levels of combat readiness. The objective of safety is to help units protect combat power through accident prevention.